Or at least immigration as it exists in the Occident today, which is done on a mass scale, with no regard for various differences (racial, cultural, religious, etc.) between natives and foreigners. Indeed there is even little to no regard for economic health. The following is a list of reports, articles, etc. concerning immigration and its negative effects. Primarily these focus on economic matters simply because a. cultural, racial and religious issues are far more obvious and b. the modern world is obsessed with the cult of mammon. Most links concern the United States. This list will hardly be extensive but should be a good starting point for immigration skepticism.
“During the 1950s, more than two-thirds of the legal immigrants admitted to the United States came from Europe or Canada, 25 percent from Latin America, and only 6 percent from Asia. By the 1980s, only 13 percent of U.S. immigrants came from Europe or Canada, 47 percent from Latin America, and 37 percent from Asia. Given the sizable skill differentials across ethnic groups, it is not surprising that changes in the national origin mix of immigrants can explain the decline in the economic performance of successive immigrant waves.”
“Immigrants tend to cluster geographically in a small number of cities and states. In 1998, almost three-quarters of U.S. immigrants lived in only six states: California, New York, Texas, Florida, New Jersey, and Illinois. In contrast, only one-third of native-born citizens lived in those states. This geographic clustering suggests that one might be able to measure how immigration affects the labor market opportunities of native-born workers by comparing those who reside in immigrant cities (for instance, San Diego) with those who reside in cities where few immigrants live (for example, Pittsburgh). However, the evidence suggests that these “spatial correlations” may be close to zero. A weak spatial correlation may not indicate that immigrants have little impact on the well-being of native-born workers, though. For example, suppose that immigration into California substantially lowers the earnings of native-born workers there. Native-born workers are not likely to stand idly by and watch their economic opportunities evaporate. Many will move from California to other states, and some people who were considering moving to California will now move elsewhere. These native-population flows effectively diffuse the adverse impact of immigration on California’s labor market over the entire U.S. economy. Ultimately, all native-born workers are worse off because of immigration, not just those who live in the areas where immigrants have clustered. It appears that the flows of native-born workers within the United States – as well as the flows of U.S. firms looking for cheap labor – indeed have responded to immigration. Because of these responses, the impact of immigration on the labor market must be measured at the national, rather than the local, level.”
NOTE: Effects are felt throughout the country thanks to native flight
“Between 1980 and 1995, immigration increased the number of high school dropouts by 21 percent and the number of persons with at least a high school diploma by only 4 percent. During that time, the wage of high school dropouts relative to that of workers with more schooling fell by 11 percentage points. The disproportionate increase in the number of workers at the bottom end of the skill distribution probably caused a substantial decline in the relative wage of high school dropouts, accounting for perhaps half of the observed drop. Thus, immigration seems to have been an important contributor to the rise in income inequality in the United States, depressing the economic opportunities faced by the least skilled workers. The fact that some native-born workers lose from immigration implies that U.S. firms gain because they can now hire workers at lower wages. Many native-born consumers also gain because the lower labor costs lead to cheaper goods and services. In fact, the labor market consequences of immigration generate a net benefit for the entire native-born population. The annual net gain from immigration is small (less than 0.1 percent of gross domestic product), amounting to less than $10 billion a year for the entire native-born population. However, immigration does more than just increase the total income accruing to native-born workers: it also induces a substantial redistribution of wealth away from workers who compete with immigrants and toward employers and other users of immigrant services. These wealth transfers may be in the tens of billions of dollars per year.”
NOTE: The rich get richer and the poor get poorer
“In 1970, immigrants were slightly less likely to receive public assistance than U.S. natives. By 1998, immigrants had a much higher chance of receiving welfare: almost one-quarter of immigrant households were receiving some type of assistance, as compared with 15 percent of native-born households. Two distinct factors account for the disproportionate increase in welfare use among immigrant households. First, because more recent immigrant waves are relatively less skilled than earlier waves, they are also more likely to use welfare than earlier waves. Further, the welfare use of a specific immigrant wave actually increases over time (both in absolute numbers and relative to native-born citizens). It seems that the assimilation process involves learning about not only labor market opportunities but also about the income opportunities provided by the welfare state.”
“1. Mexican immigrants have much less educational attainment than either native-born workers or non-Mexican immigrants. These differences in human capital account for nearly three-quarters of the very large wage disadvantage suffered by Mexican immigrants in recent decades.
2. Although the earnings of non-Mexican immigrants converge to those of their native-born counterparts as the immigrants accumulate work experience in the U.S. labor market, this type of wage convergence has been much weaker on average for Mexican immigrants than for other immigrant groups.
3. Although native-born workers of Mexican ancestry have levels of human capital and earnings that far exceed those of Mexican immigrants, the economic performance of these native-born workers lags behind that of native workers who are not of Mexican ancestry. Much of the wage gap between the two groups of native-born workers can be explained by the large difference in educational attainment between the two groups.
4. The large Mexican influx in recent decades widened the U.S. wage structure by adversely affecting the earnings of less-educated native workers and improving the earnings of college graduates. These wage effects have, in turn, lowered the prices of nontraded goods and services that are low-skill labor intensive.”
A case study by Borjas concerning Cuban migrants in Miami. Initially reported that they had not negatively impacted wages but new research since 1990 has shown otherwise. Wages for low-income and low-education natives fell as a result of the Marielitos arrival. Blacks, for example, saw a decrease in employment as their unemployment rate went from the already high 10% to 14% (page4).
“As is well known, the Marielitos were disproportionately low-skill; around 60 percent were high school dropouts and only 10 percent were college graduates. At the time about a quarter of Miami’s pre-existing workers lacked a high school diploma. As a result, even though the Mariel supply shock increased the number of workers in Miami by 8 percent, it increased the number of high school dropouts by almost 20 percent.” (6) The Marielitos were un-skilled workers and 60% were high school dropouts (10) Race riots in Miami after Marielitos arrived and a major greivance was loss of jobs due to competition with Cubans. Black wage fell by 11 percentage points between 1970 and 1983 (23)
“An estimated 49 percent of households headed by legal immigrants used one or more welfare programs in 2012, compared to 30 percent of households headed by natives. Legal immigrant households account for three-quarters of all immigrant households accessing one or more welfare programs… The overwhelming majority of illegal immigrants have modest levels of education; therefore, the high use of welfare associated with less-educated legal immigrants indicates that legalization would likely increase welfare costs, particularly for cash and housing programs.”
“In 2012, 51 percent of households headed by an immigrant (legal or illegal) reported that they used at least one welfare program during the year, compared to 30 percent of native households. Welfare in this study includes Medicaid and cash, food, and housing programs… Welfare use varies among immigrant groups. Households headed by immigrants from Central America and Mexico (73 percent), the Caribbean (51 percent), and Africa (48 percent) have the highest overall welfare use. Those from East Asia (32 percent), Europe (26 percent), and South Asia (17 percent) have the lowest. Many immigrants struggle to support their children, and a large share of welfare is received on behalf of U.S.-born children. However, even immigrant households without children have significantly higher welfare use than native households without children — 30 percent vs. 20 percent… The high rates of immigrant welfare use are not entirely explained by their lower education levels. Households headed by college-educated immigrants have significantly higher welfare use than households headed by college-educated natives — 26 percent vs. 13 percent.”
“In 2009 (based on data collected in 2010), 57 percent of households headed by an immigrant (legal and illegal) with children (under 18) used at least one welfare program, compared to 39 percent for native households with children. Immigrant households’ use of welfare tends to be much higher than natives for food assistance programs and Medicaid. Their use of cash and housing programs tends to be similar to native households. A large share of the welfare used by immigrant households with children is received on behalf of their U.S.-born children, who are American citizens. But even households with children comprised entirely of immigrants (no U.S.-born children) still had a welfare use rate of 56 percent in 2009. Immigrant households with children used welfare programs at consistently higher rates than natives, even before the current recession. In 2001, 50 percent of all immigrant households with children used at least one welfare program, compared to 32 percent for natives. Households with children with the highest welfare use rates are those headed by immigrants from the Dominican Republic (82 percent), Mexico and Guatemala (75 percent), and Ecuador (70 percent). Those with the lowest use rates are from the United Kingdom (7 percent), India (19 percent), Canada (23 percent), and Korea (25 percent). We estimate that 52 percent of households with children headed by legal immigrants used at least one welfare program in 2009, compared to 71 percent for illegal immigrant households with children. Illegal immigrants generally receive benefits on behalf of their U.S.-born children. Illegal immigrant households with children primarily use food assistance and Medicaid, making almost no use of cash or housing assistance. In contrast, legal immigrant households tend to have relatively high use rates for every type of program… Welfare use tends to be high for both new arrivals and established residents. In 2009, 60 percent of households with children headed by an immigrant who arrived in 2000 or later used at least one welfare program; for households headed by immigrants who arrived before 2000 it was 55 percent.”
NOTE: even legal migration is a drain. In fact according to that last report cited, legals use all kinds of welfare at high levels whereas illegals only use certain types.
“First, the long-term decline in the employment for natives across age and education levels is a clear indication that there is no general labor shortage, which is a primary justification for the large increases in immigration… Second, the decline in work among the native-born over the last 14 years of high immigration is consistent with research showing that immigration reduces employment for natives. Third, the trends since 2000 challenge the argument that immigration on balance increases job opportunities for natives. Over 17 million immigrants arrived [in the US] in the last 14 years, yet native employment has deteriorated significantly.”
“The total number of working-age (16 to 65) immigrants (legal and illegal) holding a job increased 5.7 million from the first quarter of 2000 to the first quarter of 2014, while declining 127,000 for natives…
Because the native-born population grew significantly, but the number working actually fell, there were 17 million more working-age natives not working in the first quarter of 2014 than in 2000. Immigrants have made gains across the labor market, including lower-skilled jobs such as maintenance, construction, and food service; middle-skilled jobs like office support and health care support; and higher-skilled jobs, including management, computers, and health care practitioners… The supply of potential workers is enormous: 8.7 million native college graduates are not working, as are 17 million with some college, and 25.3 million with no more than a high school education.”
“Many advocates of high immigration argue that it fundamentally changes the nation’s age structure, and is very helpful in solving the problem of an aging society. Demographic data, however, show that immigration has only a very small impact on the problem. While immigrants do tend to arrive relatively young, and have higher fertility than natives, immigrants age just like everyone else, and the differences with natives are not large enough to fundamentally alter the nation’s age structure.”
“In 2000 the average age of an immigrant was 39, which is actually about four years older than the average age of a native-born American. Even focusing on only recent immigration reveals little impact on aging. Excluding all 22 million immigrants who arrived after 1980 from the 2000 Census increases the average age in the United States by only about four months. In 2000 66.2 percent of the population was of working-age (15 to 64). Excluding post-1980 immigrants it is 64.6 percent.
Looking at the full impact of post-1980 immigrants reveals that if they and all their U.S.-born children are not counted, the working-age share would have been 65.9 percent in 2000, almost exactly the same as the 66.20 percent when they are all included. Immigration also does not explain the relatively high U.S. fertility rate. In 2000 the U.S. fertility rate was 2.1 children per woman, compared to 1.4 for Europe, but if all immigrants are excluded the rate would still have been 2.0. Looking to the future, Census Bureau projections indicate that if net immigration averaged 100,000 to 200,000 annually, the working age share would be 58.7 percent in 2060, while with net immigration of roughly 900,000 to one million, it would be 59.5 percent. Census projections are buttressed by Social Security Administration (SAA) estimates showing that, over the next 75 years, net annual legal immigration of 800,000 a year versus 350,000 would create a benefit equal to only 0.77 percent of the program’s projected expenditures. It is not clear that even this tiny benefit exists, because SSA assumes legal immigrants will have earnings and resulting tax payments as high as natives from the moment they arrive, which is contrary to a large body of research.”
“Looking to the future, the evidence is also clear that immigration will have only a very modest impact on the nation’s age structure. For the most part, the people who will live in America in this century are being born today. In 2000, the nation’s total fertility rate when immigrants are included is slightly under 2.1 children per woman. Without immigrants it would be 2.0 — the rate for natives.”
“Among natives without a high school degree, the fraction who were neither working nor looking for work rose from 26 percent in 1994 to 35 percent in 2015. Over the same period, the fraction of their immigrant counterparts who were out of the labor force actually declined from 12 percent to 8 percent. Turning to hours spent working, native-born high school dropouts worked an average of 1,391 hours (the equivalent of about 35 full-time weeks) per year between 2003 and 2015, while immigrant dropouts worked 1,955 hours (or 49 full-time weeks) per year. Native-born dropouts have seen their work time decline from 41 equivalent full-time weeks in the 2003-2005 period to 32 weeks in 2012-2015, while immigrant dropouts declined only from 52 weeks to 50 weeks. While natives fell from 56 percent of the nation’s high school dropouts to 52 percent, their share of the labor performed by all dropouts declined much faster — from 50 percent in the 2003-2005 period to 40 percent in 2012-2015. Among men with more than a high school degree, there are no significant differences in work time between immigrants and natives. In summary, the United States has been a magnet for low-skill immigration even as low-skill natives have worked less and less. This does not necessarily imply that immigrants push out natives from the workforce, but it does mean that immigrants replace natives, causing economic and social distress in the communities most affected. As natives leave the workforce — whether because of competition from immigrants, insufficient wages, overreliance on welfare, distaste for manual labor, or some other reason — employers turn increasingly to immigrants. Regardless of the extent to which immigration has caused the decline of work in lower-class American communities, immigration functions as a band-aid over the problem. Instead of searching for ways to get natives back to work — through higher wages, less access to welfare, or social pressure — government and business leaders have brought in immigrants to do the work instead. Limiting immigration would not solve all the problems facing low-skill natives, but it would provide the incentive to get them back to work and back into the mainstream of society.”
“When prime-age men leave the workforce in large numbers, it creates problems both for individual families and for communities. At the most basic level, people who do not work do not earn money. Healthy prime-age men have traditionally been expected to provide for their families and contribute to the community, but jobless men cannot provide even for themselves, putting a strain on family members and on the taxpayer. A recent report from the Brookings Institution simulated several anti-poverty measures — e.g., raising the high school graduation rate, encouraging marriage, increasing the minimum wage, etc. — and found that large gains in family income would come only from getting household heads back to work. Out-of-work men lose not only current income, but also the future income that prior work experience generates. Measuring the economic return to experience is complicated, but a recent study found that an added year of experience can be worth around 3 to 6 percent of wages for low-skilled workers who recently entered the labor force. This is especially important for unemployed men in their 20s who are experiencing what has been euphemistically called “extended adolescence”. They will be at a disadvantage when they do eventually look for work. Working also imparts psychological benefits that go beyond money. Taking pride in one’s work is a significant determinant of happiness even in non-prestigious occupations, and job loss is associated with depression and physical ailments. The costs of labor-force dropout are magnified when non-working men are geographically concentrated. “Many of today’s problems in the inner-city ghetto neighborhoods — crime, family dissolution, welfare, low levels of social organization, and so on — are fundamentally a consequence of the disappearance of work,” according to the sociologist William Julius Wilson. Work fosters the social and economic capital that help communities thrive. In any community where such capital weakens — whether it is predominantly black inner cities or predominantly white Appalachia — dysfunction sets in. People in these communities struggle to lead the kind of satisfying lives available to the rest of the country’s citizens. Addressing the problem should be one of the most important tasks of social policy.”
“In 2010, the average unlawful immigrant household received around $24,721 in government benefits and services while paying some $10,334 in taxes. This generated an average annual fiscal deficit (benefits received minus taxes paid) of around $14,387 per household. This cost had to be borne by U.S. taxpayers. Amnesty would provide unlawful households with access to over 80 means-tested welfare programs, Obamacare, Social Security, and Medicare. The fiscal deficit for each household would soar… Over a lifetime, the former unlawful immigrants together would receive $9.4 trillion in government benefits and services and pay $3.1 trillion in taxes. They would generate a lifetime fiscal deficit (total benefits minus total taxes) of $6.3 trillion. (All figures are in constant 2010 dollars.) This should be considered a minimum estimate. It probably understates real future costs because it undercounts the number of unlawful immigrants and dependents who will actually receive amnesty and underestimates significantly the future growth in welfare and medical benefits.”
“Denmark has called for stricter immigration laws after a report concluded that the country’s already stringent regime had saved the country £6 billion over the past 10 years… The report found immigrants from non-western countries and their decedents cost the country £1.8 billion a year while those from western countries contributed to the economy.”
“While mass migration will drive almost all population growth in the next 75 years, the growth will not deliver any improvement of living conditions or economic growth, says Prof. Rowthorn. As Britain’s population swells by a remarkable 30 million by 2080, GDP per capita — the measure of wealth enjoyed by individuals — will only enjoy marginal growth as wages stagnate… Prof. Rowthorn writes: “Many people would consider it better to settle for much less immigration and much slower population growth at the cost of slightly faster ageing”. Far better, he suggests, is to raise the retirement age slightly instead, and spare Britain tens of millions of migrants and descendants of migrants over the coming decades. Dr. David Green further states that, “Rich countries are enriching themselves at the expense of poorer countries. The attitude seems to be: let poor countries go to the expense of educating their young people and then invite them here to exploit their skills. Poor countries can’t afford to lose their best educated and motivated young. Some say that immigrants take dirty or hard jobs that locals will not do. But in other countries with low immigration such jobs are filled. They simply pay more for dirty and arduous jobs. So it should be. The end result of the current policy will be an underclass of foreign workers doing unpopular jobs. Instead we should aim for a high-wage economy in which everyone can earn a fair living.”
“First, there is no more fertile empty land on the prairies that requires immigrants to cultivate. In fact, technology used by farmers now is so efficient and labour-saving that people are leaving the land to settle in towns and cities.
Second, the cost and risk of travel are so much lower, while the pool of potential immigrants and the economic gains they can expect are so much larger than ever before in Canada’s history, meaning that an open border would result in a tsunami of immigrants.
Third, immigrants would no longer come from Europe, where populations are declining, but from Asia, Africa and Latin America. The cultures and values of these regions are much different, especially with regard to religious tolerance and the treatment of women and people with different sexual orientations. In spite of the official policy of multiculturalism, these backgrounds are likely to delay integration into Canadian society and if the migrants are numerous enough, may well end up creating ethnic enclaves in which the occupants’ culture and religions are maintained. Such enclaves can lead to economic, social and political frictions. France, the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden and other Western democracies have such problems, which have led to the electoral success of anti-immigrant parties and further social tensions.
Fourth, many immigrants will be Muslims. Most of them are peaceful and tolerant, but an unknown, potentially large number will be militant jihadists and present a serious threat to Canadian security. Surveillance of this minority will be very costly and cannot prevent all risks. No such problems and costs have ever accompanied immigration before.
Fifth, the most important difference between modern Canada and when previous waves of immigrants entered this country is the existence of the welfare state. In the absence of its universal social benefits in the past, only healthy immigrants with strong work ethics, drive and skills came to Canada. Under present conditions, potentially many immigrants would not possess these qualities and impose heavy fiscal burdens on our welfare programs and ultimately bankrupt them. It is for this reason that Milton Friedman, one of the world’s most ardent advocates for human and economic freedom concluded that, “The welfare state and free immigration are incompatible.”… in a study by myself and Patrick Grady, in which we found that the average incomes and tax payments of recent immigrants (documented by Statistics Canada) are much lower than those of the average Canadian and that the immigrants consume roughly the same amount of government services as the average Canadian.
The difference between the taxes paid and services consumed by the average recent immigrant equals about $6,000 annually. Given the total number of these immigrants, the annual fiscal burden on Canadian taxpayers comes to about $30 billion. Sixth, immigrants in large numbers cause a substantial redistribution of income, decreasing the incomes of workers and increasing the income of employers. Drawing on the basic results of a study of the redistribution effect in the United States by Harvard University Professor of Economics George Borjas, in Canada the decrease of the annual income of labour is $40 billion and the gain of employers is $43.5 billion, resulting in a net gain of $3.5 billion for the latter. This gain is called the immigration effect and is due to increased opportunities to trade. Advocates for free immigration make much of this gain but the data show that it is very small relative to the redistribution of income. These advocates also laud the increase in Canada’s aggregate national income resulting from the immigrants’ economic activities. However, all of this increase accrues to the immigrants in the form of wages, lowers per capita incomes and is accompanied by greater congestion and pollution in metropolitan areas. Increased demand for and cost of housing reduces the ability of young Canadians to own homes and start families, creating frictions between generations. The economic and social costs just discussed do not make the case against all immigration but make the case for the selection of immigrants with prospects for economic success that are high enough to eliminate the fiscal burden and the admission of immigrants in numbers small enough to prevent the risk of creating the substantial redistribution of income, the establishment of ethnic enclaves, the threat of jihadist terror and the problems associated with substantial and rapid population increases.”
“The population influx has simply overwhelmed our cities’ infrastructure and services. And the plan from all sides of politics – the Coalition, Labor and the Greens – is to continue the policy of high immigration without commensurate investment to cope with the influx. For a major commodity exporter like Australia, which pays its way in the world by selling-off its fixed endowment of resources, ongoing high immigration is self-defeating from an economic standpoint. That is, continually adding more people to the population year after year means less resources per capita. It also means that Australia must sell-off its fixed assets quicker just to maintain a constant standard of living (other things equal). The net result of this “Big Australia” policy is that living standards are being eroded as the capacity of the economy and infrastructure to absorb all of the extra people is overwhelmed, and the country’s natural resources base is diluted among more people.”
“Skills shortages “remain low by historical standards”, according to the Department of Employment, whereas there is a huge surplus of underutilised labour, thus undermining the rationale behind the large-scale importation of foreign workers. The system surrounding so-called skilled and student visas has been corrupted, with widespread rorting and fraud revealed by the recent joint ABC-Fairfax investigation (see Australia’s hidden people smuggling scandal), leading to claims the system has been overtaken by “crooks and criminals”. When combined with the Turnbull Government’s policy allowing 6 year-olds and their guardians visa entry into Australia’s primary schools (and conveniently allowing them to purchase established property), along with the proposal to allow migrants to bring into Australia their elderly parents (thus further ageing the population and straining Australia’s healthcare system and infrastructure), it is clear that Australia’s purported “skills-based” immigration system is a farce.”
“The MP for Dover, Charlie Elphicke… said that research conducted by the Resolution Foundation shows that mass migration has caused wages to be about £450 lower for the hard working classes of Britain… He also referred to work by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) which states that mass migration “does not benefit the people of Britain or those in the rest of the world”.”
“Forty-eight per cent of immigrants of working age don’t work, he said. Even after 15 years in Sweden, their employment rates reach only about 60 per cent. Sweden has the biggest employment gap in Europe between natives and non-natives. In Sweden, where equality is revered, inequality is now entrenched. Forty-two per cent of the long-term unemployed are immigrants… Fifty-eight per cent of welfare payments go to immigrants. Forty-five per cent of children with low test scores are immigrants. Immigrants on average earn less than 40 per cent of Swedes. The majority of people charged with murder, rape and robbery are either first- or second-generation immigrants.”
“New evidence from the US suggests that in ethnically diverse neighbourhoods residents of all races tend to ‘hunker down’. Trust (even of one’s own race) is lower, altruism and community cooperation rarer, friends fewer.”
“Diversity does not produce ‘bad race relations’ or ethnically-defined group hostility, our findings suggest. Rather, inhabitants of diverse communities tend to withdraw from collective life, to distrust their neighbours, regardless of the colour of their skin, to withdraw even from close friends, to expect the worst from their community and its leaders, to volunteer less, give less to charity and work on community projects less often, to register to vote less, to agitate for social reform more, but have less faith that they can actually make a difference, and to huddle unhappily in front of the television.”
NOTE: Putnam ends by saying in the long term things will work out. This seems more hopeful than concrete reality
“[A]n increase in ‘diversity’ makes existing residents of an area feel unhappier and more socially isolate, while those leaving for more homogenous areas populated by their own ethic group often get happier…. “With immigration at historically high levels across many European countries, research suggesting ethnic diversity negatively impacts social cohesion has engendered alarm”, begins the paper. However, the report found little to dispel such concerns, as it purported to “demonstrate a negative association between community ethnic diversity and indicators of social cohesion (especially attitudes towards neighbours and the community), suggesting diversity causes a decline in social cohesion.”
“[F]oreigners who come to live in Germany tend to remain strangers, even after 50 years and three generations in some cases. There are even problems among those who hold German passports… A separate study by the Bertelsmann Foundation estimates that failed immigration is already costing the country up to €16 billion ($20 billion) per year… he researchers at the Berlin Institute developed an “Index for the Measurement of Immigration” which shows how well or badly an immigrant group is anchored in German society. Various criteria flow into the index, such as education levels, job prospects and the extent to which immigrants and Germans are getting closer, for example through marriage. The study has also examined whether the children of immigrants behave differently from their parents. For the first time, there are figures to assess whether integration is taking place. Of all the immigrant groups in Germany, the southern Europeans from Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece, who made up the first wave of so-called “guest workers” who came to Germany after World War II, have done best in terms of integrating themselves. The so-called Aussiedler, ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, most of whom who came to Germany in the 1990s, are the biggest single group of immigrants, and they have also done relatively well. Their sons and daughters are making good use of the education system and the proportion of them with higher education degrees is greater than that of the general German population. But immigrants from Turkey, the second biggest immigrant group in Germany making up almost 3 million people, are very poorly integrated. They come last in the Berlin Institute’s integration ranking and the difference between them and the Germans is greatest — they are worse educated, worse paid and have a higher rate of unemployment. And it doesn’t make much difference how long they’ve been living in Germany. Some 30 percent of Turkish immigrants and their children don’t have a school leaving certificate, and only 14 percent do their Abitur, as the degree from Germany’s top-level high schools is called — that’s half the average of the German population. And because immigrants tend to have more children than the Germans, the problem is likely to get worse in the future. Today a third of all children born in Germany are born to immigrant families.”
NOTE: this article suggests things are slowly getting better and that despite the pivotal role of Islam in keeping women down and communities separate, integration will happen. Sounds more like hopeful optimism than actual fact
“Gastrointestinal and liver diseases, scabies, and tuberculosis (TB) are common amongst migrants. Henning Mothes from the Jena University Hospital in Hamburg said that German doctors are struggling to diagnose TB as the symptoms that the migrants are displaying are not typical, and the disease often goes undiagnosed. Doctors are now advised that any migrant with abdominal pain now be tested for the disease.Another illness common in the Arab world, but unheard of in Europe, is a parasite found in foxes and dogs that can be transmitted to humans. The parasite can cause severe damage to the liver, forming large cysts that are difficult to diagnose and only a skilled specialist is able to operate on them. If the parasite is allowed to spread further into the abdomen, the disease then becomes inoperable… In Austria, a deadly bacterial illness was found in an asylum home in an old converted hotel. The discovery of the disease raised alarm when it was reported that, if left unchecked, the bacteria could have a similar fatality rate as the Ebola virus.”